AccordingtoevidenceobtainedfromAsianagriculture(seechapters3and4,sectionAofthischapter,andAppendixB),wefindnonotabledifferenceininputintensitiesamongfarmswithdifferentlandtenurearrangementsunderunrestrainedprivatepropertyrights.But,asisshownincolumns7and8intable2,underthesharerestrictionin1951,farmingpopulation(admittedlyaroughmeasureoflaborinput)perunitoflandwas47percenthigherintenantfarmsthaninownerfarms.[2]Andthisdoesnotincludeincreasesinothertenantinputsasdiscerned.Thesignificantlyhigherlabor-landratiointenantfarmsthaninownerfarmsimpliesthatthemarginalproductoflandintenantfarmswashigher,andthemarginalproductoftenantlaborwaslower,thansimilarresourcesemployedelsewhere.
Theirsecondlineofargumentrestsontheso-calledabilitytoinvest.Ahighertenantineunderthesharerestriction,theyclaim,allowedthetenantagreaterabilitytoinvest,whichledtohigherinvestmentinfarmingandmoreefficientresourceuse.Ifinvestmentinfarmingyieldsreturnsataratehigherthantheinterestrate,however,incrementalinvestmentswillbemittedbyeitherthelandownerorthetenant.Forexample,ifmorecostly(effective)fertilizersledtoahigherrentalannuity,theywouldhavebeenusedwithoutrentalsharecontrol.Theclaimofinsufficientinvestmentowingtolowineofthetenantignoresthepossibilitiesofborrowingthroughthemarket,[3]andthatthelandownermayinvestinlandandraisetherentalpercentage.